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FINDING FAULT WITH IRISH DIVORCE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly seventy years, divorce was not only banned in Ire-'
land, but was also unconstitutional.1 Until November 1995, this
predominately Catholic country was the last European nation to
forbid divorce other than the island of Malta. 2 On November 24,
1995, Irish citizens voted in a public referendum to remove the
long-standing ban on divorce.3
The final vote shattered previous expectations and was ex-
tremely close: 50.3% to 49.7% in favor of the reform.4 Out of 1.62
million voters, only 9124 votes separated the sides.5  Although
some may see the referendum's victory as a "wake-up" call for
Ireland to join the modern world, 6 such a close result shows that
there is a great division in the Irish community.
In addition, the referendum's victory did not end the Roman
Catholic. Church's (Catholic Church) influence in Ireland. Even
after the passage of the divorce amendment, the Catholic Church
remains a strong social force in Ireland. The Catholic Church
showed its strength by narrowing the polls to such a close vote.7
When the referendum was first announced in May 1995, seventy-
1. See Ray Moseley, A Changing Ireland Votes on Divorce, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24,
1995, at 1.
2. See Irish Narrowly Vote to Legalize Divorce, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES (N.C.),
Nov. 26, 1995, at 1A [hereinafter Irish Narrowly Vote].
3. See Michael J. Farrell, Irish Vote for Divorce Ends Era of Church's Social Domi-
nance, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Dec. 8, 1995, at 19.
4. See id.
5. See Boyc4 Tonkin, Dublin's Splitting Headache, NEW STATESMAN & Soc'Y, Dec.
1, 1995, at 22, 22.
6. See Anna Margaret McDonough, Comment, When Irish Eyes Aren't Smiling-
Legalizing Divorce in Ireland, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 647 (1996).
7. The slippage in the polls was attributed to a public letter of the Irish Bishops Con-
ference dated October 26, 1995, "which reaffirmed church opposition to divorce and
branded the proposed change .as 'false kindness, misguided compassion and bad law."'
Moseley, supra note 1, at 1.
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two percent of voters favored divorce. 8 By September 30, the polls
showed that sixty-one percent of voters desired reform. 9 Ulti-
mately, the referendum passed by less than one-half percent.
This Comment recommends the type of divorce law that Ire-
land should adopt in light of the recent referendum. 10 Part II ex-
amines the background of divorce in Ireland, including the Catho-
lic Church's influence on Irish law and its struggle with the modem
trend towards secularization. Part III explores issues surrounding
the referendum, including a look at the forces aligned on each side
of the vote. Part IV discusses post-referendum activity in Ireland.
Part V analyzes the referendum's proposed system of divorce and
alternative systems, including the fault-based system and the no-
fault system. Part VI examines the effects of the two alternative
systems in Canada, and the United States. Finally, in light of Ire-
land's strong Catholic history and its attempt to align with the
modern world, Part VII recommends that Ireland adopt a fault-
based system of divorce.
II. BACKGROUND OF DIVORCE IN IRELAND
The 1995 Referendum reversed sixty-four years of constitu-
tional prohibition of divorce in Ireland. The prohibition of divorce
began at a time when the Catholic Church's influence was domi-
nant in Irish society. Subsequently, the Church lost some of its in-
fluence and no longer maintains a dominant position.
A. The Catholic Church's Influence
1. The Past
The Catholic Church greatly influenced the development of
Irish law. One reason for this influence is that ninety-five percent
of Irish citizens are Catholic.11 Large numbers of followers, how-
ever, are not the only reason for the Catholic Church's strength in
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. The Referendum allows courts to grant divorces where spouses have been sepa-
rated for four or more years and there is no hope of reconciliation. See The Fifteenth
Amendment of the Constitution Act (1995) (Ir.) [hereinafter Amendment].
11. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1994, at 775 (Robert Fa-
mighetti ed., 1994) [hereinafter ALMANAC].
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Ireland. Spain 12 and Italy13 also have dominant Catholic popula-
tions, yet the Catholic Church has much less influence there.
1 4
Apparently, the reason for the Catholic Church's social dominance
in Ireland goes beyond the number of adherents.
Historically, the Catholic Church offered hope, and guidance
to the Irish people. Catholicism not only survived the famine and
depopulation of Ireland in the eighteenth century, it prospered
through these hard times. 15 The Catholic Church also survived
penal codes designed to eliminate it.16 Furthermore, during the
British occupation of Ireland, the clergy won the loyalty of the
Irish people with their heroism. 17 Even though the British im-
posed capital punishment on priests caught conducting mass, the
clergy refused to submit. 18 Much of the loyalty that the clergy
earned during the occupation is still evident today.
This Catholic influence was determinative in the formation of
Irish family law. Catholic doctrine holds that marriage is perma-
nent and indissoluble, 19 although the Church may provide an an-
nulment. 20 This Catholic view of marriage was so strong that the
Irish included it in their 1937 constitution. 21 The constitution not
only forbade the granting of divorce, but also contained a provi-
sion that confirmed the "special position of the Holy Catholic Ap-
ostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed
by the great majority of the citizens." 22
The determination and influence of John Charles McQuaid,
Archbishop of Dublin, symbolizes the important role that the
12. See id. at 810.
13. See id. at 777.
14. See John Macleod, Faithful Daughter of Mother Church, HERALD (Glasgow),
Nov. 28, 1995, at 23, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
15. See Aolain Fionnaula, Where Hope and History Rhyme, J. INT'L AFF., Summer
1996, at 63, available in LEXIS, News Library, World File.
16. See id.
17. See Farrell, supra note 3, at 19.
18. See id.
19. See THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 409 (1994).
20. See ALAN JOSEPH SHATTER, FAMILY LAW IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 80
(1981).
21. See Macleod, supra note 14.
22. Id.
1997]
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Catholic Church played in Ireland.23 Ireland's previous refusal to
recognize the remarriage of individuals who obtained annulments
from the Catholic Church demonstrated that Ireland was more
conservative about marriage than the Catholic Church.
24 Simi-
larly, Archbishop McQuaid was more conservative than the liberal
reforms of Vatican 11.25 He returned from Vatican II determined
to resist similar reforms in his province. McQuaid told his congre-
gation, "You may have been worried by much talk of changes to
come. Allow me to reassure you. No change will worry the tran-
quillity of your Christian lives."
26
Archbishop McQuaid not only illustrates Ireland's conserva-
tive Catholicism, but also exemplifies the Catholic Church's influ-
ence on Irish politics. For example, in 1951 the government aban-
doned a newly proposed mother-child welfare system because of
Archbishop McQuaid's opposition. 27 His tremendous influence
illustrates the previous dominant social position of the Catholic
Church in Ireland.
2. Modern Times
Times have changed in Ireland since the period of Archbishop
McQuaid's tenure. In 1972, Ireland demonstrated its growing
secularization by removing the constitutional provision establish-
ing the Catholic Church. 28 Nevertheless, the Church maintains a
strong position in modern Irish life. For example, it operates
nearly all of Ireland's hospitals and teacher-training colleges.29
Furthermore, the Catholic Church successfully opposed the 1986
divorce referendum to legalize divorce. 30 Although government
23. See generally DESMOND FARRELL, THE CHANGING FACE OF IRELAND 109-20
(1968).
24. See McDonough, supra note 6, at 651.
25. Vatican II was the Catholic Church's 21st ecumenical council. MALACHI
MARTIN, THE KEYS OF THIS BLOOD 256 (1990). It spanned three years, from 1962 to
1965. See id. at 258. At Vatican II, "the traditional Roman Catholic view was replaced by
a new standpoint, which had more to do with modern . . .concepts of democracy and
people's power than Roman Catholic teaching." Id. at 589.
26. David McKittrick, The Changing Face of Ireland, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 23, 1994.
27. See id.
28. See Macleod, supra note 14.
29. See id.
30. See McDonough, supra note 6, at 651-52.
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sponsorship of such legislation shows a growing independence
from the Church, the final result of the referendum reveals Ca-
tholicism's continued influence in Irish culture and politics.
Initially, the success of the 1986 divorce referendum looked
promising. Not only did it have government support, a poll taken
two months before the election revealed that fifty-seven percent of
the people favored lifting the ban on divorce. 31 In a surprising
turn of events, the lead in the polls collapsed in the face of episco-
pal opposition, and the measure lost by a two-to-one margin.
32
The Catholic Church brought up secular as well as spiritual objec-
tions to the referendum. 33 With these tactics, the Catholic Church
triumphed against the 1986 divorce referendum, once again show-
ing its ability to influence public policy in Ireland.
B. Secularization
Despite the Catholic Church's influence other increasingly
influential forces have begun to emerge. Ireland's bishops are
"but one pressure group among many." 34 Although the Church
remains a strong force in Irish culture, Ireland has secularized to a
large extent. This change came about for many reasons, and the
Church is as responsible as modernization.
1. Scandals
Repeated scandals involving the clergy have diminished the
stature of the clergy in Ireland.35 First, the public learned of Fa-
ther Brendan Smyth's sexual attacks on children, and the Church's
subsequent attempts to "hush them up."' 3 6 This incident was fol-
lowed by the well-publicized fall of the Bishop of Galway, Dr.
Eamonn Casey, who used church money to provide for his teenage
son.37 Furthermore, priests have been involved in numerous child
sexual abuse incidents. 38
31. See id.
32. See Farrell, supra note 3, at 19.
33. See id.
34. McKittrick, supra note 26.
35. See Moseley, supra note 1, at 1.
36. See McKittrick, supra note 26.
37. See id.
38. See Moseley, supra note 1, at 1.
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The most recent scandal involved sixty-eight year old priest
Father Liam Cosgrave, who collapsed and died in a gay club in
Dublin.39 Cosgrave did not, however, die without proper religious
attention as another priest was on hand to give him his last rites.40
In a subsequent interview, the club owner revealed that at least
twenty other clergy members frequented the club.41 Combined,
these incidents undermined the credibility of the clergy, and dimin-
ished the influence of the Church.
2. Modernization
External factors have also contributed to Ireland's growing
secularization. Among these factors are a better educated 42 and
more well-traveled population, which has brought with it many
European and U.S. influences.43 These trends altered the way that
many Irish citizens view social issues such as divorce.
Furthermore, Reverend Enda McDonough, the President of
the National Conference of Priests in Ireland, believes that the
"weakness of Irish theology and its absence from colleges of the
National University" are partially responsible for the lessening of
Catholic influence.44 He believes that there is a fear of theology in
the church leadership that is self-destructive. 45 He also states the
failure of the Irish clergy in this respect has hampered the churches
ability to affect the society.46
3. Legislation
In response to its defeat in the 1986 divorce referendum, the
Irish government enacted legislation to broaden the recognition of
some divorces and separations.47 The first act was the Domicile
39. See McKittrick, supra note 26.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Dennis M. Linehan, Christmas in Killarney-Catholic Church In Ireland,
AMERICA, Dec. 16,1995, at 6.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. "Since that vote, the government has introduced 18 pieces of legislation covering
property rights, child custody, maintenance payments, marriage counseling, mediation,
674 [Vol. 19:669
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and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act of 1986,48 which ex-
panded the recognition of foreign divorces. 49 The Act allows rec-
ognition of foreign divorces where at least one spouse is a domi-
ciliary of the foreign jurisdiction. 50 Previously, both spouses had
to be domiciliaries of the foreign jurisdiction.
51
Next, the Irish Parliament passed the Judicial Separation and
Family Law Reform Act of 1989.52 This Act was intended to re-
form the Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law of 187053 by pro-
viding six grounds for obtaining a decree of separation.
54
III. 1995 REFERENDUM
Over 1.6 million Irish citizens voted in the 1995 Referen-
dum. 55 The referendum amended Ireland's Constitution to allow
the government to grant divorces if the couple has lived apart for
four of the last five years and there is no hope of reconciliation.
56
Previously, one who obtained a foreign divorce, or even an annul-
ment from the Catholic Church, was considered a bigamist under
Irish civil law.57 Now, the government has the authority to grant
and recognize divorces.
A. The Pro-Divorce Movement
The results of the 1995 Referendum reach far beyond chang-
ing divorce law; they illustrate the divergent forces in Irish soci-
ety.58 The Irish government, for the most part, advocates the con-
tinued "modernization" of Irish society, while the Catholic Church
social welfare and other issues involved in divorce." Moseley, supra note 1, at 1.
48. Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act (1986) (Ir.).
49. "For the rule of law that a divorce is recognized if granted in a country where
both spouses are domiciled, there is hereby substituted a rule that a divorce shall be rec-
ognized if granted in the country where either spouse is domiciled." Id. at Sec. 5(1).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act (1989) (1r.).
53. See McDonough, supra note 6, at 653.
54. Id.
55. See Tonkin, supra note 5, at 22.
56. See id.
57. See Moseley, supra note 1, at 1.
58. "The campaign divided Ireland in several ways. It was a matter of government
and most politicians against the church, urban areas against rural communities and mid-
dle-aged voters against the elderly and the young." Irish Narrowly Vote, supra note 2.
1997] 675
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and other conservatives desire to retain Ireland's moral heritage.
1. Advocates for Change
The strongest proponent of divorce reform was the Irish gov-
ernment. All six political parties in the Irish Parliament supported
the amendment, including the largest and most conservative party,
Fianna Fail. 59 Fianna Fail's support of the amendment signifies
how disenfranchised many traditional Catholics feel. According to
Nick Lowry, editor of the traditionalist Catholic magazine The
Brandsma Review, the parties' liberalization has left many Irish
Catholics without a voice in government. 60 "They used to be able
to rely on Fianna Fail,... but now they feel let down and unable
to trust any of the parties."'61
Two of the most vocal proponents of change were high gov-
ernment officials: Mary Robinson, the President of Ireland, and
Bertie Ahern, the leader of Fianna Fail. Robinson is a zealous ad-
vocate for the legalization of divorce 62 and a supporter of
women's and minority rights. Many commentators consider her to
be the most radical head of state in the European Union. 63
Ahern is legally separated from his wife and publicly presents
another woman as his partner.64 If Mr. Ahern becomes Prime
Minister as expected,65 Ireland may find itself with its first di-
vorced head of state.
In addition to endorsing the amendment, the government
mounted a substantial public campaign on its behalf. The cam-
paign expenditures totaled £500,000, which the Irish Supreme
Court later held unconstitutional. 66
2. Reasons for Change
Various concerns, ranging from individual liberty to reunifi-
59. See Mosely, supra note 1, at 1.
60. See Andy Pollak, A Lightning Conductor for the Disenfranchised, IRISH TIMES,
July 9, 1994, at 7.
61. Id.
62. See Tonkin, supra note 5, at 22.
63. See id.
64. See Moseley, supra note 1, at 1.
65. See id.
66. See infra Part IV.
[Vol. 19:669
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cation with Northern Ireland, motivated the proponents of di-
vorce. One main reason behind the amendment was to provide
separated citizens with a right to remarry.67 According to the Irish
government, 80,000 people were legally separated but unable to
obtain divorces because of the Constitutional ban.68 Furthermore,
many separated individuals had children with new partners,69 re-
sulting in significant numbers of "families" being legally illegiti-
mate.70 The only way for the government to recognize these new
families and legitimize their children was to pass the amendment
and provide separated couples with the ability to remarry.
In addition, removing the ban on divorce was seen as a way to
hasten the unification of Northern Ireland and Ireland. 71 Because
Great Britain controls Northern Ireland, divorce is legal there.
Supporters claimed that liberalizing divorce law would make re-
unification more palatable for the citizens of Northern Ireland.72
Many Irish citizens also believed that Ireland needed to shed
its Catholic heritage to join the "modern" world. Proponents of
divorce cast anti-divorce supporters as ignorant and intolerant. 73
For example, one government poster stated, "This [ban on di-
vorce] is no way to tackle the problem of marriage breakdown. ' 74
The text accompanied a picture of an ostrich with its head in the
sand,75 obviously accusing anti-divorce forces of ignoring reality.
Supporters of the amendment implied that the only way for
Ireland to truly join the twentieth century was to rid itself of
Catholic influence. First, President Robinson expressed her desire
67. See Moseley, supra note 1, at 1. ("[T]he right to remarry is what we are talking
about.").
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. "If married persons domiciled in England were divorced and remarried the re-
marriages would be valid in England and the children of the remarriages legitimate; but if
the remarried persons came to Ireland they would be subject to prosecution for bigamy
and in Ireland their children would rank as illegitimate." Helen Joan Mayo-Perrott v.
Frederick Mayo-Perrott, No. 1183 (Ir. May 1958) (LEXIS, Int'l Library, Irecas File).
71. See McDonough, supra note 6, at 663.
72. See id.
73. See Fawn Vrazo, Irish Conflicts, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 24, 1995, at 12A,
available in LEXIS, News Library, US File.
74. Id.
75. See id.
1997] 677
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to free Ireland from Christian influence. 76 She referenced, and
apparently adopted, the statement of a liberal theologian, who
claimed that Ireland needed to "detach doctrine from law."' 77 Sec-
ond, a newspaper editorial applauded the move to change Ire-
land's Constitution as "part of a much more general attempt to
free the civil law from the tenets of one church's beliefs.
'78
These examples show that the leaders for the amendment
wanted to separate modern Ireland from Catholic influence. The
Catholic Church helped mold Ireland, basing many of the nation's
laws on traditional Christian morality.79 Ireland is divided be-
tween those who wish to pursue the modern trend by focusing on
individual rights and secularization and those who wish to move
gradually and retain Ireland's traditional heritage.
80
B. The Anti-Divorce Movement
The movement against the 1995 Referendum was different
from its 1986 predecessor. Both the Catholic Clergy and conser-
vative lay people opposed the latest referendum. Thus, the ration-
ales for opposing the reform were secular as well as theological.
1. Forces Against Divorce
The Catholic Church opposed changing Ireland's Constitu-
tion.81 Even Pope John Paul II weighed in against the referen-
dum, urging Irish Catholics to "pray all the more intensely" for its
defeat.82 The Catholic Church did not focus exclusively on theo-
logical reasons for opposing the referendum; it also stressed the
social evils that divorce would bring.83
Additionally, polls indicated that opposition to divorce was
strongest in the age groups of those eighteen to twenty-four years
76. See Tonkin, supra note 5, at 22.
77. Id.
78. Ronan Mullen, Pro-Divorce Lobby Refuses to Discuss Negative Effects, IRISH
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, at 14.
79. See McDonough, supra note 6, at 671.
80. See id.
81. See generally Mullen, supra note 78.
82. Vrazo, supra note 73.
83. Much of the opposition to divorce derived from the opposition's understanding of
its negative social effects. See id.
[Vol. 19:669
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old and over sixty years old.84 It may be no surprise that the eld-
erly opposed legalizing divorce. It is surprising, however, that the
young so strongly opposed the measure and that the first genera-
tion to grow up with a more lenient government approach to sepa-
ration 85 rejected an attempt to further liberalize family norms.
Perhaps most informative as to the nature of the opposition to
divorce was the large grassroots movement against the amend-
ment. Instead of the Catholic hierarchy dominating the opposition
to divorce, Christian lay people in Ireland led the protest against
the legalization of divorce. Grassroots organizations such as Fam-
ily Solidarity and the Pro-Life Campaign typified non-church op-
position to the referendum.86 Family Solidarity is an umbrella or-
ganization that shelters other groups: Family Alert, Parents
Against Stay Safe, Women Hurt by Abortion, Family and Youth
Concern.87 This is an important distinction because it shows that
the opposition's commitment to marriage as a permanent institu-
tion was not imposed upon the people, but embraced by them.
2. Reasons for Restraint
The anti-divorce campaign concentrated on the adverse socie-
tal effects of divorce, including increased marriage breakdown, in-
creased demand for social welfare, and increased family dissolu-
tion.88 In their campaign, anti-divorce forces repeatedly stressed
that divorce was not a solution to problems in Irish society. 89 One
particular poster epitomized the belief that legalizing divorce
84. See Moseley, supra note 1, at 1.
85. The government expanded the ability to obtain foreign divorces by passing the
1986 Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act. See McDonough, supra note 6,
at 652-53. Additionally, the government enacted the Judicial Separation and Family Law
Reform Act in 1989, which basically granted couples the ability to separate, but withheld
the ability to remarry. See id. at 653-54. Thus, this generation experienced more lenient
marital norms for nine years.
86. See Fintan O'Toole, Catholic Right Has No Interest in Debate on Divorce, IRISH
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at 14.
87. See id.
88. See Carol Coulter, Ten Year Wait Is Finally Over for Those Who Campaigned for
Divorce, IRISH TIMES, June 13, 1996, at 7; see also Tonkin, supra note 5, at 22.
89. The Anti-Divorce Campaign released a list of 26 arguments against divorce. See
Coulter, supra note 88, at 7. One of the main arguments was that the availability of di-
vorce encourages marriage breakdown. See id.
1997] 679
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would increase marriage breakdown.90 It read, "Hello Divorce,
Bye-Bye Daddy."
91
Divorce opponents also sought to show the social costs of di-
vorce in economic terms. Because Ireland has expansive social
welfare programs, anti-divorce forces claimed that the legalization
of divorce would lead to increased social welfare costs of
$24,000,000.92 Further, they claimed that these increased costs
would require an increased tax rate.93 As an Irish divorce oppo-
nent stated, "'[d]ivorce will mean the decay of the Irish family ....
It will cost taxpayers an extra [ten] percent, and that doesn't even
include the costs of child delinquency and crime and work days
lost by people involved in divorce."' 94
These examples show that the amendment's opponents feared
the consequences of legalizing divorce. Their concern was not
necessarily focused on the violation of a sacrament, but on the
social costs of divorce. Divorce opponents were aware of the
problem of marriage breakdown in Irish society, but they feared
that legalizing divorce would only exacerbate the problem.
IV. POST-REFERENDUM AcTION
The referendum did not end the debate over divorce in Ire-
land. There was a subsequent attempt to overturn the referendum
in the courts. The challengers based their case on an Irish Su-
preme Court decision holding that the government acted illegally
in spending £500,000 to promote the amendment. 95 Unfortunately
for divorce opponents, this ruling came after much of the money
had already been spent.96
Subsequently, divorce opponents challenged the referendum's
results on the basis that the illegal expenditures affected the
vote.97 Although the lower court ruled for the challengers, the Su-
90. See Tonkin, supra note 5, at 22.
91. Id.
92. See Moseley, supra note 1, at 1.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Patricia McKenna v. An Taoizeach and Ors, (Ir. 1996) (LEXIS, Int'l Library, Ire-
cas File).
96. See Irish Narrowly Vote, supra note 2.
97. See Hanafin v. Minister for the Env't, No. 86/96 (Ir. June 12, 1996) (LEXIS, Int'l
[Vol. 19:669680
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preme Court reversed.98 The Supreme Court stated that:
The unconstitutional activity itself was not an electoral wrong-
doing and the manifestation of the constitutional abuse in the
form of the highly organized advertising campaign whether or
not an influential factor in the outcome was not an interference,
obstruction, hindrance, or irregularity in the conduct of the ref-
erendum. 99
Although these efforts failed, they revealed continuing opposition
to legalized divorce.
V. ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF DIVORCE
By passing the 1995 Referendum, Ireland has entered into a
new era of family law. Divorces will soon be granted to couples
who meet the Amendment's requirements. The following sections
review the system of divorce Ireland adopted, as well as other sys-
tems of divorce extant today. A study of these methods can help
devise a better divorce system for Ireland.
A. The Referendum's System
The 1995 Referendum not only reversed the ban on divorce in
the Irish Constitution, but also provided the conditions upon which
future divorce legislation must be based.100 The new Amendment
did not establish a divorce system by its passage, rather it author-
ized the Irish legislature to enact divorce legislation in compliance
with the Amendment.1 01
The Amendment provides as follows:
A Court designated by law may grant a dissolution of marriages
where, but only where, it is satisfied that-
1. at the date of the institution of the proceedings, the spouses
have lived apart from one another for a period or periods
amounting to, at least four years during the previous five,
2. there is no reasonable prospect of reconciliation between the.
spouses,
Library, Irecas File).
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See Amendment, supra note 10.
101. See id.
1997]
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3. such provisions as the court considers proper having regard
to the circumstances exist or will be made for the spouses, and
the children of both of them and any other person proscribed
by law,
4. any further conditions proscribed by law are complied
with. 102
The Amendment's system is very similar to the no-fault system;
however, it requires that the couple be separated for at least four
of the last five years.
The Family Law (Divorce) Bill, which was published in June
1996, sets out the terms of divorce.10 3 It should become law by
Fall 1997.104 The Bill is nearly identical to the system contained in
the Amendment. 10 5 The first divorces under the legislation are
expected to be granted by the end of 1997.106
The approach taken in the Family Law (Divorce) Bill reveals
the rigidity of the new Amendment. It is nearly identical to the
wording of the 1995 Referendum. Significant changes to the
adopted system would require another referendum.10 7 Some pro-
ponents of the Amendment claim to rely on judicial interpretation
to mitigate its rigidity, but judicial interpretation is an unpredict-
able method of establishing a uniform system of divorce.10 8
The Amendment does, however, allow the law to prescribe
"further conditions, ' 109 which essentially means that the legisla-
ture may add conditions. Although the law may add new provi-
sions, the Amendment's structure prohibits the waiver of any of
the bill's original provisions. For example, Ireland could adopt
fault requirements in addition to the four-year separation re-
quirement, but it could not institute a fault-based system in place
of the separation period requirement. Therefore, unless Ireland
102. See id.
103. See Maol Muire Tynan, First Divorces Expected Late Next Year, IRISH TIMES,
June 20, 1996, at 6.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See McDonough, supra note 6, at 660.
108. See id. at 661.
109. See Amendment, supra note 10.
[Vol. 19:669682
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once again alters its Constitution, it has a no-fault system of di-
vorce with a four year separation requirement.
B. The Fault-Based System
1. Origins
The fault-based system of divorce was prominent in the
United States until the 1960s.11 0 The development of fault as a
basis for divorce is rooted in religious law because religious insti-
tutions regulated marriage and divorce in the Anglo experience. 111
This religious influence shaped the ideal of marriage.
For over a century, divorce law reflected and sought to enforce
society's sense of the proper moral relations between husband
and. wife .... That ideal included duties of life-long mutual re-
sponsibility and fidelity from which a spouse could be relieved,
roughly speaking, only upon the serious breach of a moral duty
by the other spouse.112
This viewpoint does not see marriage as a useful social con-
struction of the state, but rather as the creation of a moral duty be-
tween the husband and the wife. That duty is enduring and not
terminable at will. In essence, the fault-based system of divorce
conveys the message that family commitments are permanent.
2. The Law
The idea that marriage is a permanent moral bond between
husband and wife translated into a legal system that grants divorce
only when one spouse transgresses that bond.113 When an inno-
cent spouse proves such a transgression, that spouse may obtain a
divorce. Courts give no consideration to whether the marriage is
salvageable. 114 The lack of examination of the marriage's surviv-
110. See Adriaen M. Morse Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Re-
sponsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605 (1996).
111. See Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce, Violence and the No-Fault Divorce Culture, UTAH
L. REV. 741,759 (1994).
112. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family
Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1809 (1985).
113. See J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution. The Bitter Triumph of Na-
ked Divorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519, 534 (1994).
114. See id.
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ability underscores the fault-based system's concern with moral
obligation as opposed to social utility.
Generally, there are a few statutorily enumerated grounds for
divorce. The most common grounds for divorce are adultery, ex-
treme cruelty, willful desertion, habitual intemperance, willful ne-
glect, and a felony conviction.1
1 5
The burden of proving fault is on the plaintiff. The standard
of proof varies, with some jurisdictions requiring proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence and others requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." 6 Meeting the burden of proof does not, how-
ever, always end the inquiry. Even if the plaintiff proves fault, the
offending spouse may assert a number of legal defenses.
The most prominent defense is the "clean-hands doctrine."
It maintains that if both spouses commit a fault, neither may ob-
tain a divorce.'1 7 Other defenses include: connivance, where the
spouse seeking the divorce consented to the commission of the
transgression; collusion, where both spouses committed fraud in
order to obtain the divorce decree; and condonation, where the of-
fended spouse "conditionally forgives the marital fault, so that the
condonation is nullified if the fault is repeated."" 8
Although fault-based systems of divorce were common in the
past, few modern jurisdictions retain them as the exclusive means
of obtaining a divorce. Many U.S. states now possess such systems
in conjunction with no-fault systems of divorce." 9 Further, fault
often plays an important role in the division of marital assets.
120
C. The No-Fault System
1. Origins
Many jurisdictions established the no-fault divorce system in
response to increasing dissatisfaction with fault-based systems of
divorce, the growing divorce rate in Western nations, and the rise
115. See Morse, supra note 110, at 607-08. For a discussion of early divorce law in
England, see DiFonzo, supra note 113, at 520.
116. See Morse, supra note 110, at 610.
117. See id.at 611.
118. Id. at 612.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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of the philosophy of individualism. Fault-based systems became
unpopular in Western Europe and the United States for many rea-
sons, including the conflict and adversity that fault systems seemed
to cause. 121 Many commentators believed that the adversarial na-
ture of the system promoted hostility and violence. 122 By eliminat-
ing fault as the basis for divorce, reformers hoped to reduce the
animosity that arose from conflict.12
3
Another reason that reformers reacted against the fault-based
system was its "messiness." "[L]awyers and judges-the profes-
sional community-found that working within the fault-based di-
vorce system was unpleasant, difficult, and messy.' 24 Courts be-
came less comfortable handling moral questions in the family
context due to the rise of liberal individualism, which "increased
our national tolerance for heterodox moralities, and has dimin-
ished the urge to impose morality profligately. ' 125
Rooted in the Protestant view of marriage, the fault-based
system could not survive as the dominant means of divorce in a
society that increasingly valued liberal individualism over its relig-
ious past. Instead of viewing marriage as a moral duty, established
by God, no-fault divorce views marriage as the creation of the
state.126 It frees courts from making uncomfortable moral deci-
sions and allows them to base their decisions on more value-
neutral criteria.
During the time that the fault-based system was falling out of
favor, the demand for divorce was increasing. A reform move-
ment reacted to the problem. "Between 1969 and 1985 divorce
law in nearly every Western country was profoundly altered. ' 127
This reform was not due to hostility against the institution of mar-
riage, but rather was an attempt to preserve troubled marriages. 128
121. See Morse, supra note 110, at 613 ("[O]ther rationales for doing away with fault
were to eliminate the bitterness of the proceedings ... and also to avoid the adversarial
character of most divorces obtained on fault grounds.").
122. See generally Wardle, supra note 111.
123. See id. at 741.
124. Id. at 748 (emphasis added).
125. Schneider, supra note 112, at 1843.
126. See Morse, supra note 110, at 606.
127. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 66 (1987).
128. See DiFonzo, supra note 113, at 520.
6851997]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
In fact, many reformers believed that no-fault divorce would lower
the divorce rate. Professor DiFonzo provides this example:
The last hurrah of therapeutic divorce came in the 1960s in
England and California. Realizing that fault was no longer a
barrier to divorce by mutual consent, conservative reformers in
both jurisdictions staged a dramatic gambit .... [R]eformers
gambled that eliminating all fault grounds would be a sufficient
enticement for divorce-minded couples to submit to a recon-
ciliation-minded social welfare establishment.
129
Thus, reformers intended for no-fault divorce to replace the moral-
laden fault-based system with a utilitarian approach that allowed
divorce only when there was no hope of reconciliation.
2. The Law
The methods of obtaining a no-fault divorce vary, but the
most common requirement is a court finding that the marriage has
irretrievably "broken down." This finding does not rest on moral
blame or impose a standard of behavior on married couples. In-
stead, the court's function is "simply to determine whether a
breakdown has occurred without raising questions of blame.
130
The extent to which a court will examine the marriage rela-
tionship depends on the jurisdiction. Since the beginning of its no-
fault divorce reform, the United States has not put any serious ob-
stacle in the path of couples wishing to obtain a divorce. 131 On the
other hand, Canada maintained fairly rigid standards until 1986.132
Canada's resistance to divorce on demand eventually gave
way to a less restrictive standard. 133 Today, most Western juris-
dictions do not seriously examine the survivability of the marriage.
Current no-fault divorce standards allow divorce on demand. 134
129. Id.
130. See LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM 238 (1980).
131. See infra Part VI.A.3.
132. See WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATrERNS 136 (1993).
133. See id.
134. As discussed previously, no-fault divorce was originally intended to lower divorce
rates. In practice, however, no-fault divorce systems evolved to the point of allowing
unilateral divorce. See infra Part VI.A.2.
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VI. SYSTEMS IN PRACrICE
The effects of different divorce systems becomes evident by
examining their application in different jurisdictions. The United
States and Canada utilized both fault and no-fault systems at dif-
ferent times.. Their experiences with both systems are relevant to
Ireland's current situation.
A. The U.S. Experience
Although the United States is not a Catholic nation, Catholi-
cism and Protestantism heavily influenced how the United States
dealt with divorce.1 35 Through the period of fault-based divorce,
the U.S. ideal of marriage closely paralleled the Catholic ideal.'
36
The advent of no-fault divorce, however, brought a new ideal of
marriage to the United States and resulted in strong social effects.
1. The United States Under the Fault-Based System
England incorporated Catholic ecclesiastical law into secular
law until Henry VIII created the Anglican Church. 137 Nonethe-
less, much of the Catholic ideal of marriage remained a part of the
legal system. 138 Because the British simply imposed Anglo com-
mon law on their colonies instead of granting local autonomy,
many of its colonies adopted British family law.139 Thus, even af-
ter winning its independence from England the United States re-
tained the British divorce system.140
Because the United States did not have ecclesiastical courts, it
eventually conferred divorce jurisdiction on the state courts. 141
135. See generally GOODE, suora note 132, at 136-37.
136. The Protestant view of marriage was not far removed from the Catholic view.
The Protestant Reformers believed that "marriage ... was an estate ordained by God."
RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN
SOCIETY 41 (1988). According to the Catholic ideal of marriage, "the marriage bond has
been established by God himself." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note
19, at 409.
137. See GOODE, supra note 132, at 136.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Morse, supra note 110, at 607.
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The most common system of divorce law was fault based.142 It was
not a rationally planned system designed to maximize social utility,
but rather a system that "reflected and sought to enforce society's
sense of the proper moral relations between husband and wife.
'143
The law conveyed a message. Marriage was more than a con-
tract; it was a life-long partnership dissolvable only by death or se-
rious fault. 144 In Maynard v. Hill,145 the U.S. Supreme Court
enunciated the rationale behind fault-based divorce:
[Marriage] is something more than a mere contract. The con-
sent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but
when the contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a rela-
tion between the parties is created which they cannot change.
Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or
entirely released upon the consent of parties. Not so with mar-
riage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the
parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution,
in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply in-
terested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor prog-
ress.146
This moralistic view of marriage was not without criticism.
Critics charged that fault-based divorce resulted in gender inequi-
ties.147 Additional criticism focused on the fault-based system's
inability to resolve the following issues: the steady increase in di-
vorce rates, the increasing divorce rates among the middle and up-
per classes, the feminist movement's attempt to upgrade the status
and opportunities of women, and a reactionary backlash of non-
custodial fathers. 148
Furthermore, many couples went to extreme lengths to cir-
cumvent the fault-based restrictions. 149 First, couples traveled to
jurisdictions with less restrictive divorce laws to obtain quick di-
142. See id.
143. Schneider, supra note 112, at 1809.
144. See Wardle, supra note 111, at 749; see also Schneider, supra note 112, at 1809.
145. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
146. Id. at 210-11.
147. See Morse, supra note 110, at 616.
148. See HALEM, supra note 130, at 235.
149. See id. at 234-35.
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vorces. 150 Second, many couples lied to courts in order to con-
vince judges that a fault had been committed.151 This deception
raised concerns that the requirements of the fault-based system
caused people to disrespect the legal system. 152
2. No-Fault Era
a. California Leads the Way
These criticisms finally began to influence public policy in
1963 when the movement to change the divorce system began. 153
The first successful move toward a no-fault system occurred
through the California Governor's Commission on the Family
(Commission). 154  Former Governor Jerry Brown created the
Commission to abolish the existing fault-based system of divorce
and to make recommendations for a new system.155 Furthermore,
reformers intended for the Commission to find the "real" causes of
divorce and to make recommendations to deal with those
causes..
1 56
The Commission recommended that the state adopt a no-fault
divorce system. 157 Its recommendations, however, went further.
"The Commission tied the removal of fault grounds to the opera-
tion of a powerful socio-legal agency, whose mission would be to
provide restorative aid to failing marriages. ' 158 Divorce reformers
hoped to substitute therapeutic jurisprudence for fault-based ad-
versarial methods. 159
150. See id. at 234. Some jurisdictions intentionally tried to attract the profitable di-
vorce trade. Nations including Mexico, Haiti, and France offered "quickie" divorces. See
id.
151. See id. at 234-35.
152. See GLENDON, supra note 127, at 65.
153. See id.
154. See generally Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-
Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1987).
155. See id.; see also GOODE, supra note 132, at 137.
156. See Kay, supra note 154, at 5.
157. See id. at 5.
158. DiFonzo, supra note 113, at 541.
159. See HALEM, supra note 130, at 238. The Commission stated, "the purpose of
adopting the standard we suggest would be to permit, indeed to require, the Court to in-
quire into the whole picture of the marriage." GLENDON, supra note 127, at 79.
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Under the Commission's recommendations, the state would
be responsible for determining whether a marital breakdown had
occurred. This determination would not be a cursory finding by a
judge; instead, the couple would be forced to submit to therapy
and counseling to ascertain whether their marriage was
"broken." 160 Experts in the fields of psychology and counseling
would make recommendations to the court concerning the status
of the petitioning spouse's marriage.
161
In 1969, many of the Commission's recommendations were
enacted into law, and California became the first state to adopt a
no-fault divorce system.162 Some Commission recommendations,
however, Were not adopted and the recommended inquiry into the
status of the marriage never materialized. California trial courts
simply refused to deny divorce petitions. 163 In fact, seven years af-
ter California adopted the no-fault divorce system, not one Cali-
fornia trial judge refused to grant a divorce. 164
The legislature ignored the initial policy recommendations
because a therapeutic approach was too costly in terms of finances
and privacy.165 The recommended system would have created a
costly system including judges and therapists,166 and some feared
that the new system of courts would be too intrusive. 167 These
concerns prompted the California legislature to veto the creation
of a statewide system of family courts. 16
8
b. Reform Sweeps the Nation
Although California only partially enacted the Commission's
recommendations, no-fault divorce continued to sweep the nation.
160. See DiFonzo, supra note 113, at 541.
161. Professor DiFonzo records that "the counselor was expected to work with the
parties and prepare a written report setting forth the 'counselor's recommendations to-
gether with supporting facts as to the continuance of their marriage."' Id. at 542.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 547.
164. See id. at 550.
165. See id. at 547-50.
166. See id. at 548 ("The cost estimates for supplying the requisite psychiatrists and
social workers were daunting.").
167. See id. at 547-49.
168. See id. at 547-48.
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In 1970, the influential National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (National Conference) addressed divorce.
169
It issued the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA),
170
which was a model no-fault system. Through the UMDA, the Na-
tional Conference advocated no-fault divorce laws for the na-
tion. 171 With California and the National Conference pioneering
the reform movement, all states adopted no-fault divorce systems
by 1987.172
As in California, however, recommendations for serious in-
quiry into the breakdown of the marriage never took shape. 173 In-
stead, the no-fault system became a system of unilateral termina-
tion of marriage at will. "Inquest into the reality of breakdown
became a mere ritual. ' ' 174 As a result, there are no legal obstacles
to unilateral divorce in the United States.175
3. Effects of the Transition
The no-fault divorce system failed to solve the old problems,
and in some cases, made them worse. 176 Rather than providing
solutions to marital breakdown, it provided divorce on demand.177
Instead of eliminating the combative nature of fault divorce, no-
fault divorce propagated it.178 Contrary to the intentions of re-
formers, the adoption of the no-fault divorce system resulted in in-
creased divorce rates, higher levels of poverty among women and
children, and increased violence against women.
169. See Kay, supra note 154, at 5.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 2. Some states, however, retain concurrent fault-based grounds. See id.
at 5.
173. The writers of the UMDA, like the California Governor's Commission, insisted
that there be an inquest into the reality of marriage breakdown. See GLENDON, supra
note 127, at 77.
174. See id. at 78.
175. See id. at 81.
176. See id. at 65.
177. See HALEM, supra note 130, at 282 (Stating that clearly the reform drive has
made divorce easier to obtain).
178. See id. at 281 ("As long as the attorney's 'goal is always to get the best terms for
his client ... the ethic of combat survives."').
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a. Increased Divorce Rates
Many commentators reject the notion of a causal connection
between no-fault divorce and increased divorce rates. 179 An un-
deniable surge in divorce rates, however, accompanied the adop-
tion of no-fault divorce in the United States. In 1960, when all
states retained a fault based system, sixteen percent of first mar-
riages ended in divorce. 180 By 1996, when all states possessed no-
fault systems, forty percent of first marriages ended in divorce. 181
Notwithstanding these figures, divorce is even more wide-
spread than the statistics concerning first marriages indicates. Be-
cause remarriage rates are high in Anglo nations, 182 the overall di-
vorce rate is higher than indicated by the number of first marriages
ending in divorce. Another, and perhaps more representative in-
quiry into the actual numbers of divorces in the United States may
be achieved by examining the ratio of divorces to married women.
According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, the ratio
of divorces per 1000 married women was 1.3 in 1950.183 This ratio
increased nearly twenty fold, reaching 21.0 by 1980.184
Professor Mary Ann Glendon contends that some studies may
have difficulty in finding a direct causal relationship between no-
fault divorce and increased divorce rates. 185 She points out that
changes in the law will have long-term effects that are slow to ap-
pear and hard to distinguish from other social factors.186 Moreo-
ver, changing the law affects the symbolism and moral lesson that
the government projects. 187 "Statute books and case reports are
remote from most people's lives, but the imaginative portrayal of
family life and ethics in divorce law reaches deeply into our cul-
ture .... -1188 In Glendon's view, no-fault divorce carried a message
179. See GLENDON, supra note 127, at 107.
180. See David Whitman, The Divorce Dilemma, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 30,
1996, at 58.
181. See id.
182. See GOODE, supra note 132, at 150.
183. Id. at 138.
184. See id.
185. See GLENDON, supra note 127, at 107.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. Id.
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that changed the U.S. ideal of marriage.
It began to carry the suggestion that no one is ever to blame
when a marriage ends: marriages just break down sometimes,
people grow apart, and when this happens even parents have a
right to pursue their own happiness ....
The American story about marriage, as told in the law and in
much popular literature, goes something like this: marriage is a
relationship that exists primarily for the fulfillment of the indi-
vidual spouses. If it ceases to perform this function, no one is to
blame and either spouse may terminate it at will. 189
The no-fault divorce culture propagated this viewpoint in the
United States.
The no-fault divorce system replaced the fault based system's
moral message of permanence and loyalty with a message of self-
fulfillment and individualism.190 Thus, the change to the no-fault
system caused people to increase their expectations of marriage by
viewing it as a means of self-fulfillment. The change also increased
the likelihood that the rising expectations would not be met be-
cause spouses were focusing on their own fulfillment. Combining
increased expectations with a lower likelihood of fulfilling them
resulted in an increased rate of divorce. 191
b. Harmful Effects on Women
The consequences of the no-fault system go beyond increased
divorce rates. The new divorce system also created unequal bar-
gaining positions, thereby causing economic hardship and physical
hardship by contributing to divorce-related violence.
i. Financial Hardship
Research indicates that women generally fare worse economi-
cally under the no-fault system than under the old fault-based re-
189. Id. at 107-08.
190. See id. at 108; see also Schneider, supra note 112, at 1839-40.
191. See PHILLIPS, supra note 136, at 630-31. I do not claim that no-fault divorce was
the sole, or even most important, cause of increased divorce rates. "National and state
legislation, different demographics and social structures, varying economic conditions and
cultural climates all have their impact on divorce." Id. at 630.
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gime.192 Surveys indicate that the income of women tends to de-
cline substantially following divorce, while the income of men
tends to increase. 193 Moreover, the likelihood of receiving ali-
mony, the duration of alimony awards, and the proportion of mari-
tal property awarded to women decreased under the no-fault sys-
tem, while the proportion of debt that women were required to
pay increased. 19
4
An important reason that women fare worse economically
under no-fault divorce systems is a shift in bargaining power that
puts women in a weaker negotiating position than they would be
under a fault-based system.195 Under the fault-based system,
"[n]egotiating practices developed in which one spouse might ex-
change cooperation in obtaining a divorce for economic conces-
sions from the other." 19
6
The fault-based system often afforded economic protection to
a dependent wife and children when a family broke up. 19 7 The
economic protection applied whether the fault basis for the di-
vorce was legitimate or contrived. A husband seeking a divorce
under the fault-based system was not free to leave. 198 He had to
convince his wife to lie or press charges. As a result, the wife had
leverage in post-divorce economic concessions 199 that she does not
possess in the no-fault system. Overall, under a no-fault regime
women have less earning potential after divorce than men, yet re-
ceive a greater portion of the debt and fewer assets.
ii. Divorce-Related Violence
Reformers intended the no-fault divorce system to replace the
192. See Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Re-
suits, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 75, 76 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
Hill Kay eds. 1990).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See GLENDON, supra note 127, at 82.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 65 ("[For one spouse to get a divorce when the other was unwilling and
had committed no marital offense ... was difficult and time consuming.").
199. See id.
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adversarial nature of the fault-based system.200 They believed that
the adversarial system "tended to aggravate and perpetuate bitter-
ness between the spouses. ' 201 "Families on the verge of marital
breakdown were forced to appear in court as adversaries before
judges who were limited to taking testimony on the existence of
matrimonial misconduct. '20 2 Because no-fault divorce does not
require this adversarial setting, reformers thought that divorce
would be less traumatic.
Ironically, adopting no-fault divorce may have had the oppo-
site effect. Since the implementation of no-fault divorce there has
been a rise in domestic violence and other forms of violence
against women.203 "[T]he continued existence of pervasive serious
violence associated with divorce-related litigation a quarter of a
century after the adoption of no-fault divorce laws defies the
claims and expectations of no-fault divorce reformers." 204
No-fault divorce does not prevent bitterness and violence, but
causes it.205 Professor Lynn Wardle states:
[T]he no-fault divorce culture that has grown out of specific no-
fault divorce law reforms is the real seedbed of divorce related
violence. Three facets of the no-fault divorce culture nurture
seeds of violence: (1) underestimation of the value of the fam-
ily and stable family relationships, (2) overestimation of the
power of the law to engineer the happy breakup of marriages,
and (3) marginalization of religious values in family law and
public discourse. These factors have produced alienation and
normalized conflict, and contributed to an authoritarian mind-
set in the no-fault divorce culture.206
Unilateral divorce at will robs spouses of any way to prevent
the break up of their marriage. Thus, a sense of powerlessness of-
200. No-fault supporters "proclaimed its potential for ... eliminating adversary con-
tests." HALEM, supra note 130, at 281.
201. GLENDON, supra note 127, at 65.
202. Kay, supra note 154, at 35.
203. See David Blankenhorn, The State of the Family and the Family Policy Debate, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 431,433 (1996).
204. Wardle, supra note 111, at 741.
205. See id. at 745. But see, Martha Heller, Note, Should Breaking Up Be Harder To
Do?, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 263 (1996).
206. Wardle, supra note 111, at 774.
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ten accompanies the dramatically life-changing consequences of
divorce. Meanwhile, the divorce culture reinforces the "victim's"
feelings of helplessness. "The message of the law is clear-there is
no causality, no fault, and thus no legal control. ' 207 This situation
produces feelings of helplessness, frustration, and anger that often
lead to violence. 20 8
c. Harmful Effects on Children
No-fault divorce has radically increased the number of single-
mother families in the United States. In 1960, five percent of chil-
dren lived in single-mother families; by 1990, this number had
risen to twenty-seven percent. 209 Because of the high number of
children living with their divorced mother, many of the financial
and physical hardships that women suffer also affect their children.
Increased family disruption may also have harmful physical
and emotional effects on children. Divorce often results in dislo-
cation, which can be traumatizing to a child.210 Furthermore, chil-
dren of divorce are more likely to have emotional trouble, perform
poorly in-school, and become delinquents.211 "Many children and
adolescents develop a wide range of post-divorce symptoms that
include very aggressive behaviors, depression, sleep disturbance
and learning problems. '212
These results are even more disturbing because the effects of
divorce are not short-term. Studies show that the effects of di-
vorce are long-term; children do not "bounce back" after their
parents divorce.213 In fact, studies show that the harmful effects of
207. Id. at 766.
208. See id. at 766.
209. See DiFonzo, supra note 113, at 552.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See Judith S. Wallerstein and Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psycho-
logical and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM.
L. Q. 305, 309 (1996). Certainly, not all children of divorce suffer from such problems as
severely as others; some may not suffer at all. See id. at 310-11. Several factors mitigate
the harmful effects of divorce. "These include: (1) a close, sensitive relationship with a
psychologically intact, conscientious parent; (2) the diminution of conflict and reasonable
cooperation between parents; (3) whether or not the child comes to the divorce with pre-
existing psychological difficulties." Id. at 311,
213. See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
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divorce may affect children ten to fifteen years after the event.214
B. The Canadian Experience
As a nation of Anglo heritage, Canada's experience with di-
vorce is comparable in many ways to that of the United States.
Both nations adopted their legal traditions and early family law
from England. As a result, both Canada's and the United States'
original systems of divorce law were fault-based.
There are, however, important differences that make the Ca-
nadian experience particularly relevant to Ireland's situation.
Canada's smaller population 215 more closely mirrors Ireland's
population.216 Furthermore, the Canadian system places more
authority in the hands of the federal government, similar to Ire-
land's system under the Referendum. 217
Another important similarity between Canada and Ireland is
that the Canadian system provides a more generous "safety net" 218
than the United States.219 In this regard, Canada is more similar
to Ireland than to the United States.220 Furthermore, Canada's
system of divorce under the 1968 Divorce Act is similar to the sys-
tem Ireland will adopt.221
1 1. The Fault-Based Era
Canada, like the United States, adopted much of its law from
Apr., 1993, at 47, 47-48.
214. See id.
215. Canada had a population of 27,351,000 in 1992. See ALMANAC, supra note 11, at
748. The United States had a population of 256,561,239 in 1993. See id. at 823.
216. Ireland had a population of 3,521,000 in 1992. See id. at 775.
217. Canada's Constitution gives the federal government jurisdiction over "marriage
and divorce". CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) § 91(26).
218. By safety net I mean the social welfare mechanisms of the state.
219. See Claire L'Heureux-Dube, Economic Consequences of Divorce: A View from
Canada, 31 Hous. L. REV. 451, 459 (1994).
220. "Canada has a strong state, bent towards communitarianism ... more welfare,
and a higher rate of taxation than the United States." GOODE, supra note 132, at 137.
221. Ireland's proposed divorce system requires a finding that there is no hope of rec-
onciliation and that the couple has been separated for four years. See Amendment, supra
note 10. Likewise, Canada's 1968 Divorce Act required a three-to-five-year waiting pe-
riod and a finding of marital breakdown. See ALASTAIR BISSETT-JOHNSON & DAVID C.
DAY, THE NEW DIVORCE LAW 25 (1986).
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England.222 Both Protestantism and Catholicism influenced Eng-
land's divorce law, which used the fault-based system of divorce.
223
Thus, Canada inherited a fault-based system of divorce that was
infused with Catholic and Protestant ideals.
224
Unlike the United States, the federal government in Canada
has jurisdiction over "marriage and divorce. '225 Despite that grant
of power, the provinces retain authority over the "solemnization of
marriage." 226 This arrangement resulted in a lack of uniformity in
Canadian divorce law during its fault-based era.
Prior to 1968, the majority of provinces allowed divorces only
in cases of adultery.227 Other provinces, however, had varied di-
vorce laws. Nova Scotia, for example, had more permissive di-
vorce laws; it granted divorces on the grounds of cruelty.228 On
the other hand, Newfoundland and Quebec did not grant divorces
at all.229 In 1968, Canada simplified and systematized its divorce
law by passing the Divorce Act of 1968.
2. The No-Fault Era
The Divorce Act of 1968 did not radically change the means
by which couples could obtain divorces, but it was Canada's first
step towards no-fault divorce.230 For the first time Cana6la, rec-
ognized irreconcilable marital breakdown as sufficient grounds for
divorce, while retaining fault grounds for divorce. 231 Even when a
couple applied for a divorce on the basis of marital breakdown, the
Act required stringent proof and a three to five year waiting pe-
riod.232 In fact, the requirements for obtaining a divorce establish-
222. See GOODE, supra note 132, at 136.
223. England incorporated Catholic ecclesiastical law into secular law until Henry
VIII created the Anglican Church. See id. Much of the Catholic ideal of marriage, how-
ever, remained a part of the system. See id.
224. See id.
225. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) § 91(26).
226. Id. § 92(12).
227. See CHRISTINE DAVIES, FAMILY LAW IN CANADA 328 (4th ed. 1984).
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See GOODE, supra note 132, at 140-41.
231. See id. at 140.
232. See id. at 140-41.
[Vol. 19:669698
Finding Fault with Irish Divorce Law
ing marriage breakdown were so rigid, only one-third of divorcing
couples followed this route. 233
To further liberalize Canadian divorce law, the Law Reform
Commission of Canada released a Report on Family Law in March
1976 (Report). 234 The Report recommended that the principle of
fault be removed from divorce law to eliminate the adversarial na-
ture of divorces. 235 Furthermore, it recommended the adoption of
"conciliation measures and the establishment of a unified family
court system." 236 Eight years later, the Commission's recommen-
dations were adopted in the 1985 Divorce Act.237
The Conservative Government passed the 1985 Divorce Act
and implemented it in 1986.238 The Act reduced the number of
grounds for divorce from fifteen to one, marital breakdown.239
"The new Act provides that a divorce is to be granted upon an
application by either or both spouses on the ground that there has
been a breakdown of their marriage. '240 Marital breakdown is
proven when one of the following criteria is met: (1) the couple
separates for one year prior to the determination of divorce; (2)
one spouse commits adultery; or (3) one spouse treats the other
with physical or mental cruelty. 241
One obvious change in the new law was the reduction of the
five-year waiting period established by the Divorce Act 1968, to
the one-year separation period under the Divorce Act 1985. The
government hoped this would reduce conflict, while providing
couples a period of reflection regarding their decision.242
The new divorce law resulted in at-will divorce in Canada. 243
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
19 (198
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
ately."
See id. at 141.
See L'Heureux-Dube, supra note 219, at 456.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See ALASTAIR BISSET--JOHNSON & DAVID C. DAY, THE NEW DIVORCE LAW
6).
See id. at 25.
Id.
See Divorce Act, 1985, ch. 4, § 8(2)(a)-(b) 1986 Acts. Parl. Can., 177-78.
See BISSETT-JOHNSON & DAY, supra note 238, at 27.
"[I]f the couple can reach an agreement they can get a divorce almost immedi-
GOODE, supra note 132* at 141.
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There was no longer a true determination of marital breakdown;
couples who wanted to get divorces could obtain them almost im-
mediately. 244 In fact, the new legislation relaxed the marital
breakdown requirement to such an extent that by 1988, eighty per-
cent of all divorces in Canada were based on a separation of one
year or more.
245
3. Effects of the Transition
Similar to the U.S. experience, Canada's adoption of no-fault
divorce resulted in increases in divorce and poverty among women
and children. Unique to Canada's experience, however, is the in-
ability of its generous social welfare system to prevent these harsh
consequences.
a. Increase in Divorce
Under the fault-based system, Canada possessed the lowest
divorce rate of any Anglo nation,246 at a rate of 1.7 divorces per
1000 women in 1951.247 Ten years later and still under a fault-
based system, Canada had a rate of 1.6 divorces per 1000 married
women.248 At that time, Canada's divorce rate was substantially
lower than the U.S. divorce rate.
249
In 1969, only one year after adopting-a no-fault system of di-
vorce, however, Canada no longer had the lowest divorce rate of
any Anglo nation.250 By then, Canada's divorce rate had "more
than doubled, rising above that of any other Anglo country (except
of course that of the United States). ' 251 Moreover, this increase
did not result from the release of a backlog of couples desperate to
divorce. The Canadian divorce rate has continued to climb. By
the 1980's it was nearly ten times what it was in 1950.252
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. "Canada began the decade of the 1950s with the lowest divorce rate of any of
these countries, and remained in that position until 1969." See id. at 137.
247. See id. at 139.
248. See id.
249. In 1961, the U.S. rate was 8.3 per 1000 married women. See id.
250. See id. at 137.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 138.
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Furthermore, Canada abandoned its tough requirements be-
cause the Commission did not believe that the stringent require-
ments were effectively dealing with marriage breakdown. Similar
to the United States, Canada's attempt to prevent no-fault divorce
from becoming at-will divorce failed. In the end, both jurisdictions
not only were unable to provide therapeutic aid to marriages in
trouble, but were also unable to determine which marriages could
be salvaged. Thus, Canada's first step toward no-fault divorce
evolved into divorce on demand.
b. Harmful Effects on Women and Children
The increase in divorce changed the structure of Canadian
families. Single-parent families doubled, from 478,000 in 1971 to
955,000 in 1991.253 In 1991, women headed eighty percent of sin-
gle-parent families, with fifty-seven percent of those families re-
sulting from divorce or separation. 254 Additionally, forty percent
of divorces granted in 1989 involved families with children.
255
The majority of single-parent families headed by women do
not fare well economically. 256 In fact, by 1991 almost sixty-two
percent of families below the poverty level were headed by
women.257 As the number of divorces rise, single women and their
children continually grow poorer and the feminization of poverty
escalates. 25
8
c. The Failure of the Safety Net
Canada maintains one of the most generous social safety nets
in the world, including public assistance, a national pension pro-
gram, a national medicare system, unemployment insurance,
workers' compensation, victims of crimes compensation, and legal
aid. 259 Many provinces have introduced enforcement regulations
implementing automatic pay deductions from maintenance orders.
253. See L'Heureux-Dube, supra note 219, at 457-58.
254. See id. at 458.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 459.
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and reciprocal enforcement. 260 Furthermore, the Divorce Act
1985 "allows the court to 'recognize any economic advantages or
disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its
breakdown."' 261 This provision authorizes claims for
"income/pension disadvantage due to time taken out of the labor
force, in the past, for family formation activities.
'262
Despite this strong safety net, Canada failed to prevent the
social ills that the less communitarian-minded United States en-
countered. Canada's social welfare programs and strict support
enforcement probably mitigated the effects of no-fault divorce.
Unfortunately, they were unable to prevent increased divorce rates
and increased poverty among women and children.
VII. RECOMMENDATION FOR IRELAND
A. The Legal Recommendation
Ireland should adopt a fault-based system of divorce. There
are two ways for Ireland to establish such a system. One option is
to add fault grounds to the existing system. Thus, to obtain a di-
vorce, one would have to prove marital breakdown, separation for
four years, and fault. This approach is unacceptable, however, be-
cause it would force non-offending spouses to remain in marriages
that subject them to mental or physical cruelty.263
Furthermore, combining fault-based grounds for divorce with
a marital breakdown requirement dilutes the moral message of the
purely fault-based system. The core of the fault-based system's
message is that marriage is a permanent institution, violable only
by a grave moral offense.264 In contrast, this hybrid approach
would require innocent spouses to establish marriage breakdown
as well as moral offense. This puts too great a burden on the inno-
260. See id.
261. Peter Ross, Divorce-Canadian Style: Compensatory Support, 5 J. LEGAL ECON.
67 (1995).
262. Id.
263. "[Piure nonfault grounds with long waiting periods ... would not respond to the
perceived need to permit people whose marriages have failed to get on with their lives, a
need which gave rise to the demand for liberalized divorce in the first place." GLENDON,
supra note 127, at 75.
264. See infra Part V.A.1.
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cent spouse, and dilutes the fault system's moral standard.265
The best approach for Ireland is to hold another referendum
and amend its constitution. Ireland should adopt a new amend-
ment that establishes a fault-based system. In addition, it should
repeal the four-year separation and irreconcilability requirements.
Under this new amendment, divorce should only be granted
where spouses transgress the moral bonds of the marriage. Ireland
should recognize fault grounds that its citizens believe are an of-
fense against the marriage. At a minimum, the grounds for di-
vorce should include adultery, abandonment, and cruelty.26
6
As in other jurisdictions, the party seeking the divorce should
have the burden of proving fault. Furthermore, when the plaintiff
proves fault, the "guilty" spouse should have the defenses of con-
donation, connivance, and collusion.267 These defenses are neces-
sary to discourage couples from using the courts to obtain at-will
divorces.
B. The Rationale
Ireland is a unique nation. It possesses the Catholic heritage
of Spain and Italy, which sustain low divorce rates,268 and the An-
glo legal and cultural heritage, that generally maintains high di-
vorce rates. Both traditions should contribute to Ireland's revised
system of divorce.
265. Under a hybrid system, an innocent spouse is not released from the marriage due
to a violation of the marriage covenant, but because the marriage cannot survive. There
is a shift from the focus on a moral standard to concern over social utility, and the utility
message will eventually override the moral standard. Canada's experience with the 1968
Divorce Bill shows that this approach is untenable, it will eventually be supplanted by
pure no-fault divorce.
266. These fault grounds are those historically employed by fault-based jurisdictions
whose systems were influenced by Catholicism. See Morse, supra note 110, at 607-08. For
a discussion of early divorce law in England, see DiFonzo, supra note 113, at 520. Adul-
tery is the most justifiable element to add as a condition to divorce because the Catholic
Church views adultery as an offense to marriage: See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH, supra note 19, at 572 ("Adultery is an injustice. He who commits adultery fails
in his commitment. He does injury to the sign of the covenant which the marriage bond
is, transgresses the rights of the other spouse and undermines the institution of mar-
riage.").
267. For a discussion of these defenses, see supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
268. See GOODE, supra note 132, at 78.
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1. The Moral Heritage
Ireland's adoption of a no-fault system radically departs from
its moral tradition. No-fault divorce makes marriage solely the
creation of the state,269 eliminating fault or blame from the equa-
tion. Instead of setting a standard of behavior, it seeks to manipu-
late the institution of marriage to the most utilitarian outcome
possible.270 It infuses the ideal of marriage with the concepts of
self-fulfillment and individualism.
271
This change is a drastic shift from the traditional Irish ideal of
marriage, which was stricter than the Catholic Church's view of
marriage.272 No-fault divorce makes Ireland's first step into di-
vorce law a giant leap with far-reaching effects. "[T]he family is so
intertwined with other social structures that it is not possible to
transform it without reversing a multitude of other trends in mod-
ern social life, from the economic to the religious." 273
Some may prefer a revolutionary pace, but successful reform
and modernization should not disregard the core values of the
people.274 This is especially true in the regulation of family life.
While morals and law need not coincide, any law must cope
with the way the people it regulates view their moral relations.
This is particularly true of family law: moral issues are central
to family life and family self-governance, and hence central to
the context in which family law operates. 275
Instead of taking a giant step of lifting the nearly seventy year ban
on divorce and implementing a no-fault divorce system, Ireland
should take a less drastic step. Ireland's reforms should respect
and involve the moral values imbedded in its society, and simulta-
neously address modern problems.
The fault-based system incorporates familiar moral and relig-
ious principles into the law, while allowing the state to grant di-
269. See Morse, supra note 110, at 606.
270. See id.
271. See GLENDON, supra note 127, at 108.
272. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
273. GOODE, supra note 132, at 318.
274. One potential affect of ignoring the religious values of the people is increased
domestic violence. See Wardle, supra note 111, at 774.
275. See Schneider, supra note 112, at 1806.
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vorces to those in genuine need. First and foremost, the fault-
based system views marriage as a sacrament, consistent with the
Catholic Church's view of marriage.276 Under the fault-based sys-
tem, marriage is administered by the state, but is more than a mere
creation of the state. The fault-based system views marriage as a
permanent union that cannot be terminated at the will of one
party. Instead, one spouse must commit an offense against the
marriage before the innocent party can dissolve the marriage.
This fault-based system is not identical to either Catholic doc-
trine or the modern "Western" view of marriage. Although Ire-
land is no longer the "guardian of the faith, '' 277 this system recog-
nizes that the Catholic tradition is still a vital part of Irish society.
Ireland is a nation in transition. As a mixture of Catholic and An-
glo heritage the fault based system is uniquely suited for Ireland.
2. Social Consequences
The Anglo nations that adopted no-fault divorce experienced
dramatic increases in broken families accompanied by a host of
social ills. 278 Child-poverty, the feminization of poverty, and in-
creasing rates of divorce-related violence became serious social
problems for nations that adopted no-fault systems of divorce.279
To avoid similar problems, Ireland should avoid implementing
unilateral no-fault divorce.
Ireland's current system of divorce is more restrictive than
most other Anglo systems because it requires an inquiry into the
status of the marriage and a four year waiting requirement. Many
jurisdictions in the United States possessed inquiry requirements,
but never gave them any effect.280 Canada also included an a in-
quiry into the survivability of the marriage in its divorce system,
276. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
277. An old provision in Ireland's Constitution recognized the social position of Ca-
tholicism in Ireland. See Macleod, supra note 14.
278. See supra Part V.A.3 & B.3. "In most parts of the world, however, the rising di-
vorce rates have brought substantial increases in the number of people-especially
women and children-who are suffering economically and need state support to survive."
GOODE; supra note 132, at 318.
279. See id.
280. See infra 5.A.2.a-b.
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but the planned protection was never implemented.281
Furthermore, Canada once possessed similarly restrictive
separation requirements under the Divorce Act of 1968. These
stringent requirements, however, did not prevent surges in the di-
vorce rate in Canada. Likewise, the only comparable Irish exam-
ple indicates strict requirements would not be effective in Ire-
land.282  Since the Judicial Separation Act 1989, judicially
sanctioned separations in Ireland have continued to increase.
283
While some reformers assume that Ireland's strong safety net
will protect it from the social ills seen in the United States, Can-
ada's experience speaks strongly against that assumption. Canada,
like Ireland, has a strong communitarian bent.284 Although, Can-
ada provides strong social welfare programs to divorcees and their
children, 285 it has been unable to prevent increased divorce rates,
the feminization of poverty, and increased poverty among chil-
dren.286 There is no reason to believe that Ireland will be able to
avoid the pitfalls that similarly situated Canada could not avoid. If
Ireland does not reform its divorce regime, it will witness higher
divorce rates and a demand for increased social spending to deal
with the effects of divorce.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Ireland was right to remove the constitutional ban on divorce,
but wrong to adopt the no-fault system. In their haste to secularize
Ireland, reformers moved too far by adopting a divorce system
that fails to reflect Ireland's strong moral heritage and ignores the
probable negative social effects of "divorce on demand." Instead
of ignoring the Catholic values of the Irish people, reformers
should employ those values to construct divorce laws that will free
spouses caught in destructive marriages, but protect society from
the tragic effects of a jolting shift to no-fault divorce law.
Ireland should move forward using both hindsight and fore-
281. See infra 5.B.2.
282. See Carol Coulter, Points to be Thrashed Out in the Debate, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 2,
1995, at 6.
283. Id.
284. See GOODE, supra note 132, at 137.
285. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
286. See id.
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sight. The fault system can act as a link between Ireland's Catholic
heritage that has served it so well, and the development of modern
Irish society. Ireland is uniquely suited to respect its strong
Catholic heritage while still addressing the problems of a more
pluralistic and modern society.
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